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proficiency in his preparatory course. We know, too, that some
of the members of the profession there are supplying themselves
with works of accredited authority in this country. The common
law of England and the United States has been authoritatively
adopted in Liberia by a statute to this effect: "Blackstone's Commentaries, as revised and modified by Chitty or Wendell, and the
works referred to as the sources of municipal or common law in
Kent's Commentaries on American Law, Vol. 1, shall be the civil
and criminal code of law for the Republic of Liberia, except such
parts as may be changed by the laws now in force and such as
may hereafter be enacted." And, in conclusion, we would express
the confident expectation that this interesting community of free
and freed men will, by their history, vindicate their claim to be
regarded as members of the great family of nations in the fellowE. W.
ship of progress and civilization.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
NORTIHERN BANK OF KENTUCKY v. 0. M. KEIZER et alU
'Where a partnership firm becomes insolvent, having partnership property and
partnership creditors, and also separate property and separate creditors, and the
partnership creditors exhaust the partnership property, the separate creditors have
a priority of right to receive an equal percentage of their claims out of the separate estates, and if anything remains it is to be distributed among both classes of
creditors pari passu.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBERTSON, J.-J. W. and W. 0. Houghton, who had been
partners in the manufacture of bagging and rope, and owned
between them much more individual than partnership property,
apprehending their inability to pay all their debts, on the 11th of
January 1862 assigned all their partnership and individual property to C. M. Keizer in trust to apply the partnership property
to the payment of their partnership debts, the individual property
to the payment of their individual debts, and then to distribute
among all the creditors, pro rata, the residue of the individual
fund, if any should remain after full payment of the individual debts.
1 We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of F. K. Hunt, Esq.-ED. A. L. R.
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It appears that, under such a distribution, neither class of
creditors would receive their whole debts, but that the percentage
of the individual creditors would be much larger than that of the
partnership creditors.
The trustee, apprehending difficulty, and wishing to avoid unnecessary responsibility, petitioned the Circuit Court of Fayette
to direct the mode of distribution to which all the creditors should
be adjudged as entitled.
The partnership creditors, in an answer and cross-petition,
charged that the assignment " was made in contemplation of insolvency to prefer one class of creditors, and therefore they
prayed for a pro rata distribution of the entire trust-fund among
all the creditors, without distinction of class."
The individual creditors demurred to that cross-petition, and
the Circuit sustained the demurrer.
That the assignment was made "in contemplation of insolvency"
is not denied, and, consequently, if the distribution which it directs,
is not such as each class of the creditors was entitled to by law,
it does, inconsistently with the spirit of the statute of 1856, prefer one set of creditors over another, and, for that end, must be
deemed unavailing, even though the apparent preference was not
the voluntary choice of the assignors, but was dictated, as we may
presume it was, by a belief that the law itself would make the
same distribution, and therefore they could not, if they would,
prevent it.
Then the only question is, Does the law make the preferences
prescribed by the assignment?
As to partnership property, equity gives to the partnership
creditors priority over the individual creditors of the firm.
No doctrine of the modern common law is more conclusively
settled, nor on more rational and consistent grounds.
The compensatory and reciprocal priority of the individual
creditors, as to the individual property, though not, as the other,
,universally recognised, is nevertheless, in our opinion, so well
settled by both reason and preponderating adjudications as to
entitle it to our recognition.
Each partner having an implied lien. on the partnership property as a security for the payment of all the partnership debts,
no individual creditor of any of the partners can subject his
debtor's interest otherwise than cum onere, or, in other words,

NORTHERN BANK OF KENTUCKY v. KEIZER.

could not make his debtor's interest available until all partnership
debts shall have been paid; and, on the equitable principle of
subrogation, each partnership creditor is entitled to the same lien
or priority.
This is the law and its reason.
Precisely the same reason does not apply to individual creditors
claiming a priority as to the individual property.
But the principle of equality and the equitable doctrine of marshalling assets do apply to their case, and entitle them to say to
the joint creditors " You have kept us out of the partnership
effects, and we have a compensatory right to be indemnified out
of the separate property of our individual debtors." This accords
with the well-settled rule that, when one creditor has a right to
resort to two funds, and another creditor is restricted either by"
him or the law to only one of them, the creditor so excluded from
one fund has an equitable right to priority as to his only resource,
co-extensively with his privation. As to the principle and the
extent of this rule as applicable to this case, there is some diversity among jurists, a small minority denying such priority to any
extent, and a very large majority concurring in its existence, and
apparently to the whole extent of the individual property, if all
of it shall become necessary for full payment of the individual
indebtedness.
The ground occupied by that minority is, in our opinion, indefensible on either principle or authority; and that occupied by
the majority is so well maintained by both principle and adjudged
cases as to command the recognition of it as the only true ground
to some extent.
But, between those extremists, we are satisfied that, while one
class is altogether wrong, the other class is not altogether right.
The rationale of the individual priority neither requires nor
authorizes an extension of it, under all circumstances, to the whole
of the individual property until the entire individual debt shall
have been paid, nor the application of it at all when the partnership creditors do not assert, but waive, their priority as to tha
partnership property and thereby leave the whole estate, of all
classes, unincumberedand subject to all creditors alike, without
distinction of class.
If the exhaustion, by the partnership creditors, of the partnership property should pay only fifty per cent., and the individual
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property should be sufficient to pay the whole of the individual
debts, why should the class having an unqualified right to resort
to both funds be required to accept only half of their debt and the
class having a more restricted right be adjudged entitled to the
whole of their debt ? Were this the law, it would be an anomaly
without either analogy or reason. But the doctrine of equal
reprisal is the only one that is either consistent or sustained by
controlling or satisfactory authority.
It is not true, as sometimes said, that the reason of those relative priorities is that the partnership creditors trust the partnership property, and the individual creditors trust the individual
property.
The truth is that each class of creditors look to both classes
of property, and unless they conflict, each have a right to subject
both individual and partnership property.
Looking at the philosophy of the law, we do not doubt that the
individual priority exists to the extent of the individual loss when
partnership effects are taken or claimed by partnership creditors,
and that it extends no further.
We are also satisfied that the few adjudged cases and many
obiter sayings which, on a superficial analysis, might seem to
carry it further, do so on no recognised or consistent principle,
and in a very indefensible manner, and should not be regarded as
settled authority in this court. We therefore feel that it is both
our judicial privilege and duty to recognise and apply what, on a
survey of multitudinous cases and dicta, we believe to be the true
doctrine, which is, that, if partnership creditors exhaust the partnership estate without full payment, the individual creditors have
the reciprocal right to make as much of their debt out of the individual estate, and, if then any individual property should remain
undisposed of, it shall be distributed pari assu among all the
creditors, regardless of class.
Consequently, as the assignment in this case directs a distribution, essentially atifferent from that just defined as legally rightful
among all the creditors, the distribution must be made according
to law, as herein indicated.
Wherefore the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The question as to what rule should
govern the application of the assets of

an insolvent partnership firm, where a
contest had arisen between their part-
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nership and their individual creditors,
made its appearance in the English
equity courts at an early day. In Twiss
v. Mlassey, I Atkyns 6, decided in 1737,
Lord Chancellor lARnDwIcx settled the
rule that the partnership assets should
be primarily liable for partnership debts,
and that the private debts of the partners
should have a like priority as to the private property of the partners. This
principle had already been acted upon
much earlier, in 1693, by Lord SOMERS,
in Richiardsonv. Gooding et al., 2 Vern.
Ch. 293 ; in 1715 by Lord HARCOURT,
in Ex parte Crowder, 2 Vern. Ch. 706;
and in 1728 by Lord KING, in .x parte
Cook, 2 P. Wins. 500; hut Lord HARDwican announced the reasons for it, that
each class of creditors should look first
to the property to which they gave the
credit, and therefore it is frequently called
Lord HAaDwicK's rule. This rule
prevailed without question until the time
of Lord THURLOW, who altered somewhat the practice as to proving claims
under separate commissions (Ex parte
Hodgson, 2 Brown's Ch. 5), and is commonly said to have changed the rule,
though this is denied by PERLEy, J. :
.'arvis v. Brooks, 3 Foster 142. In .x
parte Elton, 3 Vesey 343, and Bx parte
Abell, 4 Ves. 837, Lord LOUoBOROUGH
restored the old rule, and, after much
consideration, Lord ELBox adhered to
it as settled: Exparte Clay, 6 Yes. 813;
Dutton v. Morrison, 17 Ves. 207. The
rule is adopted without question by all
the English text-writers: Gow on Partnership, pp. 339 et seq.; Lindley 1001
(Law Library ed. vol. 103) ; Collyer,
sect. 920 et seq. ; and is now established
in England by the statute 6 Geo. 4, e.
16, s. 62.
II. In America, however, the same
rule has not been received without a
good deal of discussion and hesitation.
1. Chancellor KENT, 3 Comm. 65,
adopts it as df general rule of equity,

and declares that, notwithstanding Judge
STo RY's objections, he feels no hostility
to it, and thinks it, upon the whole,
reasonable and just. On the other hand,
STORY declares that it "rests on a foundation as questionable and as unsatisfactory as any rule in the whole system of
our jurisprudence," but admits that, such
as it is, "it is for the public repose that
it should be left undisturbed :" Partnership, sects. 377, 382.
Notwithstanding this expression of
dislike by so high an authority as Ar.
Justice STORY, a very large majority
of the courts of this country have felt
bound, either on general principles or
on authority, to follow Chancellor KENT,
and establish the rule as declared by
Lord H1DwicKc ; but his lordship's
reasons, the credit given respectively to
the different estates, have not been regarded as at all satisfactory. Indeed,
the matter of credit, as a practical fact,
is disposed of unanswerably by the remark of Gissox, J., in Bell v. Newman,
5 S. & R. 92, that, "in the usual course
of transactions, each class indiscriminately trusts to the whole estate, both
joint and separate." The ground of the
first part of the rule, the priority of part'
nership creditors, is the clear right of
the partners themselves to have their
joint property appropriated to the payment first of their joint debts. To this
right their joint creditors are equitably
entitled to be subrogated, and it has
been constantly held that the creditors
can work out this equity only through
the right of the partners themselves.
This is the reasoning of all the cases.
But, on the other hand, there is not precisely the same ground for the converse
proposition which gives the separate creditors the priority as to separate property. The true ground of this rule is
the natural inclination of equity to give
reciprocity. It is not at all maintainable that the ruli produces exact equality
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in individual cases; indeed, the cases
whxere it does are probably rare exceptions ; but, as the advantage of the partnership creditors, on the one hand, seems
founded on irresistible reasoning, the
best that equity can do for the individual
creditors, on the other, is to give them a
reciprocal advantage as to the private
estate.
4. Such being the reasons given for
the rule, we proceed to the authorities.
The earliest well-argued case on the
subject is Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R.
78, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, partly on general principles
and partly on the statute of that state
directing an equal distribution of the
assets of decedents, declared the rule to
be,. as it is given in the principal case,
that tin separate creditors should receive the same percentage of their claims
out of the separate estate as the partnership creditors had of theirs out of the
partnership estate, and then both classes
should come upon the remaining private
property pari passu. In this case was
shown the fundamental diversity of opinion as to the origin of the English rule.
The chief justice (TILGHMAN) and Duxcue, J., regarded it as a rule of bankruptcy only, and adopted chiefly for
convenience. GinsoN, J., regarding it
as a general rule of equity, and thinking
the statute of distribution not applicable
to the case, dissented from so much of
the opinion as allowed the partnership
creditors to come on the separate funds
before full payment of the individual
creditors. His argument in favor of the
English rule on the ground of reciprocity
and equity is perhaps the most forcible
to be anywhere found, and has received
the sanction of the same court in subsequent cases, Andrews v. Miller, 3 Harris
(15 Pa. State) 316; Walker v. Byth, 1
Casey (25 Pa. State) 216; Singizer's
Appeal, 4 Casey 524; and Black's Appeal, 8 Wright (44 Pa. State) 503; and

Houseal 4- Smith's Appeal, 9 Wright
484, in the former of which Tno.rsox,
J., gives the subject a full and final examination, and settles the law of Pennsylvania in accordance with that of England and the majority of the United
States, that each class of creditors has a
right to be satisfied in full out of its respective estatds, and the residue only to
be applied to claims of the other class.
The same rule was adopted in MAnLAND in the early and well-considered
case of 3fcCulloh v. Dashiell, 1 Harr.
& Gill 96, 1 American Leading Cases
460, affirmed in Simmons v. Tongue, 3
Bland 341, and Gleim v. Gill, 2 Mld. 1 :
in NEw Yonn, Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige
167; Payne v. Mathews, 6 Paige 19;
North River Bank v. Stewart, 4 Brad.
254; s. c. 4 Abbott's Pr. Rep. 408;
Jackson v. Cornell et al., 1 Sandf. Ch.
348 ; Kirby v. Carpenter, 7 Barb. 373;
and Ganson v. Lathrop, 25 Barb. 455
in NEW HArssnixE, Jarvisv. Brooks,
3 Foster 136 ; Crockett v. Crain, 33 N.
H. 542 ; Holton v. Holton, 40 N. H.
77; Treadwell v. Brown, 41 N. H. 12:
in MASSACHUSETTS, by Statute of Insolvency 1838, ch. 163, sect. 21, though it
is a matter of some doubt how far the
courts would have recognised the rule
independently of the statute; Newman v.
Bagley, 16 Pick. 570; Allen v. Wells, 22
Pick. 450; Sparkawk v. Russell, 10 Mlete.
305 : in RHODE ISLAND, Tillinghast v.
Champlin, 4 R. I. 173: in Nw J~nsny
(it seems), Cammackv. Johnson, 1 Green,
Ch. 163; Wisham et al., v. Lippincott, 1
Stockton, Ch. 353; Linford v. Linford,
4 Dutcher 113: in Oio, Rodgers v.
Aferanda et al., 7 Ohio State 179, one
of the fullest and best cases on the subject, overruling the previous case of
Grosvenor et al. v. Austin's Adm., 6 0.
103: in INDIANA, Weyer v. Thornburgh,
15 Ind. 124: in ILLIOS, forrison V.
Kurtz, 15 Ill. 193: in GEORGIA, Cleghorn v. Bank, 9 Ga. 319; Baker et al.
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v. Winmpee et al., 19 Ga. 87 ; Toomnbs v.
Hill, 28 Ga. 371 : in ALABAIA, Emnanuel v. Bird, 19 Ala. 596 ; Smith et al. v.
Z1fallor?'s Exr., 24 Ala. 628 ; Bridge v.
McCullough's Adma., 27 Ala. 661: in
SOUTH CARnoLNA, Waddrop v. lVrard,
3 Desaus. 203 ; Hallv. Hall,2 McCord,
Ch. 302, though the recent cases of Fcning v. Billigs, 9 Rich. Eq. 149, and
Gadsden v. Carson et al., Id. 252, seem
to be in conflict with the previous ones :
and in the Supreme Court of the United
States, Murrill v. Neill et al., 8 How.
414. The same rule was also adopted
in the United States Bankrupt Law of
1841, 5 Stat. 440, 448, § 14; In re Varren, Daveis 320.
On the other hand, the rule is discarded
in VERxONT, Washburn v. Bank, 19 Vt.
278 ; Bardwell v. Perry, Id. 292 : in
COXNECTICUT, Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn.
41: and in Mississirri, Daldgren v.
Duncanet al., 7 Sm. & Marsh. 280 ; but
in Connecticut the decision is based
partly, and in AIississippi entirely, on
the statutes of those states.
III. The English rule has some exceptions, which will be found in the textwriters ubi supra, but we have not thought
it worth while to notice them, as they
have been characterized as "eccentric,"
M rrillv. Neill, 8 How. 426, and are
not generally adopted by the courts of
this country.
IV. To the rule, as thus establitied in
a very large majority of the American
states, the principal case only partially
assents. In point of authority the decision arrived at is supported only by
the now overruled case of Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & H. 78. In point of principle, we may be permitted to express a
doubt whether the balance of abstract
equity is so decidedly in its favor as to
justify a departure from so well-settled
and universal a rule. That the mode
of division declared in it is conducive to
equality in the particular case, is undeVOL. XIV.-6
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niable, but no general rule has yet been
devised which will produce practical
equality in even a majority of cases, and
the foundation of the prior claim of the
separate creditors to the separate property is rather an equitable reciprocity
than an actual equality hitherto unattainable.
As an abstract question in ethics, it is
not easy to see why either class of creditors should have any preference where
the loss is the misfortune and not the
fault of either. The partnership creditor becomes such, as a general rule, in
the course of business and with the expectation of profit. The risk of loss,
therefore, is one which enters into his
calculations, and hence it may be argued
that he ought to suffer the loss rather
than a private creditor whose claim may
have arisen otherwise. On the other
hand, the private creditor may equally
have become so in expectation of profit,
and, whether he did or not, it is for the
public welfare that the law should encourage trade. Much, therefore, might
be said on both sides, and a conclusion
which favored either class would certainly fail to be satisfactory in all cases.
The preference of the partnership creditors as to partnership property is, however, founded on incontrovertible grounds
of law and equity, and therefore the rule,
as generally received, is perhaps as satisfactory as any that can be devised. The
practical effect of the departure from it,
in the decision in the principal case, is to
throw the separate property into hotchpot in favor of the joint creditors 'wherever it is, proportionably to its debts,
greater than the joint property, without
giving the separate creditors any reciprocal advantage when the partnership estate
is, as it commonly is, proportionably
the larger.
V. The rule, as above discussed, is to
be understood as applicable only tn
equitable distribution. Whether a credit-
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or of either class who has obtained a
legal hold, by execution or otherwise, on
either kind of property, can be defeated
in his right by this rule, is a different
question, on which we have not space to
enter. The tendencies of the cases are
strongly in favor of the partnership

creditors, both by supporting their liens
when first acquired against separate property, and b postponing the liens of
separate creditors on joint property,
though prior in time.
J. T. M.

-District Court of Kansas.
DAVID MEDE v. JOHN HAND.
The constitutional convention or legislature of a state may modify or change the
remedy of a creditor; the only limit imposed upon these bodies by the national
constitution is, that the change or modification shall not be such as to impair the
obligation of the contract.
Laws, exempting a reasonable amount of the property of a debtor from execution, are valid as to prior contracts.
The validity of appraisement and exempting laws, with reference to the pro
vision of the constitution of the United States forbidding any state to pass a law
impairing the obligation of contracts, discussed by GILCHORIST, J.

ONT March 10th 1858 John Hand executed to David Mede a
note, in the following words and figures, to wit:"March 10th 1858.
"$1000.00.
" One day after date I promise to pay to David Mede, or order,
one thousand dollars, with 12 per cent. interest, until paid. Value
received.
[Signed.]
"JOHN HAND."
On the fifth of July 1861, Mede commenced an action upon the
note in the Shawnee county District Court. On the first day of
the October Term, the plaintiff, Mede, took a judgment against
Hand for $1390, debt and interest.
On the first of March 1862, the sheriff of Shawnee county
levied an execution upon the south-east quarter of section four,
town thirteen, range thirteen, east of the third principal meridian,
as the land of the defendant, Hand, upon which he then lived.
Hand notified the sheriff, at the time of the levy of the execution,
that he claimed said land as exempt from sale, under execution,
by virtue of the 9th section of Article 15th of the Constitution
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of the state of Kansas. The sheriff did not cause the land to be
appraised. The sheriff disregarded the notice of the claim of
exemption, and, on the 6th of February 1862, inade the sale. On
the 1st of April following, it being the first day of the next term,
the plaintiff, tfede, moved the court to confirm said sale.
This motion was resisted by the defendant.
After the date of the note upon which judgment was rendered
the legislature of Kansas passed an act requiring the sheriff not
to sell property for less than two-thirds of its appraised value.
(See sectiong 444, 445, and 446 of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure.)
In September 1861, the legislature passed another act which
provided that judgment-debtors or their assignees and lien-creditors
might redeem property sold on execution within two years from
the day of sale by paying the amount of the bid with interest.
The 9th section of article 15th of the constitution of the state
of Kansas, which took effect on the 29th of January 1861, provides "1A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres
of farming land, or of one acre within the limits of any incorporated town or city, occupied as a residence by the family of the
owner, together with all the improvements on the same, shall be
exempted from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not
be alienated without the joint consent of both husband and wife,
when that relation exists; but no property shall be exempt from
sale for taxes, or for the payment of obligations contracted for the
purchase of said premises or for the erection of improvements
thereon: -Provided,The provisions of this section shall not apply
to any process of law obtained by virtue of a lien given by the
consent of both husband and wife."
Against the confirmation of the sale the defendant objected, for
the following reasons:First. Because, under the constitution of the state (Art. 15, sec.
9, supra), the property was altogether exempt.
Second. Because, under the Code of Civil Procedure (sect%.
444-6), the property should have been appraised before the sheriff
proceeded to sell it, and it should not have been sold for less than
two-thirds of its appraised value.
Third. Because, under the act of the state legislature, which
became a law September 2d 1861, it should have_been sold sub-
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ject to redemption, and no deed made until the expiration of the
time of redemption.
The plaintiff contended that the foregoing provisions of the constitution and acts of the legislature, so far as they relate to this
case, are contrary to the 10th section of the first article of the
constitution of the United States, and consequently void. This
section provides that "1no state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILCHRIsT, J.-The first question which arises is, whether this
provision of the constitution of the United States applies to the
constitution of the state of Kansas. If the prohibition was a limitation upon the power of the legislature of a state, then it would
not apply to a constitution; but as it is a limitation upon the power
of the state, the state has no more power to do the thing prohibited,
through a constitutional convention, than it has by or through its
legislature ; consequently the provision of the constitution of the
state of Kansas, for the purposes of this case, is to be considered?
as though it were an act of the legislature.
The main question is, Do these enactments impair the obligation
of the contract upon which the judgment in this case was rendered ? If they do, they are within the express letter, as well as
the spirit, of the prohibition, and consequently void. If they, on
the contrary, do not, then they are valid.
In determining this question, it is necessary to understand
clearly what is meant by " obligation of contracts." Chief Justice INARSHALL , in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield,4 Wheat.
122, has defined the phrase "obligation of contracts" with clearness and precision, and supported the correctness of his definition
by a train of reasoning that is unanswerable. "A contract is,"
says he, "an agreement in which a party undertakes to do, or not
to do, a particular thing. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this 'is, of course, the obligation of his contract. In
tie case at bar, the defendant has given his promissory note to
pay the plaintiff a sum of money on or before a certain day. The
contract binds him to pay that sum on that day; and this is its
obligation.- Any law which releases a part of this obligation must,
in the literal sense of the word, impair it."
The obligation is created by the stipulation of the parties. It
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is enforced by the law. It is as perfect in a state of nature as in
a civil community. The only difference is in the mode of enforcing it. See striking illustration by MARSHALL, C. J., in Ogden
v. Sanders, 11 Wheat. 213.
When individuals enter into society, they relinquish the natural
right of coercion, and society, on its part, engages to furnish a
remedy for the violation of contracts or other wrongs. It is then
the duty of society to furnish reasonable and adequate remedies.
But these remedies are subject to be changed and modified from
time to time, according to the views of society and the dictates of
humanity and public policy. And such modification and change
do not in any sense impair the obligation of contracts. Obligation and remedy are two distinct and different things. "They,"
in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, 11originate at different times." The obligation to perform, is coeval with the undertaking to perform; it originates with the contract itself, and operates anterior to the time of performance. The remedy acts upon
a broken contract and enforces a pre-existing obligation. The
legislature has no power to change a contract in the smallest particular. To do so would impair its obligation; but it has full
power to change and modify the remedy from time to time, according to its pleasure. And such change does not in any respect
impair the obligation of the contract. The provision of the constitution under consideration contemplates restraint as to the obligation of contracts, not as to the application of remedy. It leaves
each state to furnish such remedy as it may think proper for the
enforcement of the obligation.
That obligation and remedy are distinct from each other, may
be further illustrated by an examination of the state constitutions.
They, it will be found, provide for each, as two separate and distinct things.
The constitutions of the states of Maine, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Michigan, Arkansas, Texas, and Iowa, all provide that the legislature "shall
pass no law impairing the obligation of contracts." The constitutions of the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois provide that the
legislature shall not "pass any law impairing the validity of contracts." The constitutions of the states of Kentucky and Pennsylvania provide that no law shall be passed "impairing contracts."
lNow it is evident that the conventions, which framed these con-
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stitutions, as well as that which framed the constitution of the
United States, intended to provide for precisely the same thing.
The inviolability of contracts made by the parties, against legislative infraction, was the thing intended to be secured. This was
the idea in the mind of the conventions; and the phraseology by
which this idea is expressed, belongs to the person who framed
the provision; and, as in some of the constitutions, the word con
tract alone is mentioned, in some others the word validity of contracts, while in others the obligation of contracts. They should
be so construed as to give effect to the leading idea in the mind
of the conventions, without placing too much stress upon the meaning of the word obligation. These state constitutions having
secured the inviolability of contracts, as made by the parties,
proceed to make regulations for remedies upon violated contracts,
or for the violation of rights. The constitution of the state of
Maine, in the 19th section of the 1 Declaration of Rights," provides that " every person, for an injury done him in his person,
reputation, property, or immunities, shall have a remedy by due
course of law ; and right and justice shall be administered freely
and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay." The other constitutions contain substantially
the same provision. They also provide substantially that the trial
by jury shall remain inviolate. The constitution of the United
States also provides for the remedy. In the same section, which
prohibits any state from passing any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, it is provided that "no state shall make any thing
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt."
Now, when we find these constitutions securing the inviolability
of contracts, and at the same time providing for a remedy in case
of their violation, it is impossible to conceive that the conventions
which framed them regarded "contracts," " validity of contracts,"
or "obligation of contracts" as including the reinedy to be provided for their enforcement when violated.
The legislatuie has no power to change the contracts as made
by the parties, but in determining in what time suits shall be
brought in their courts, for the enforcement of broken contracts,
the form of action, the process to be used, the mode of trial, the
property which shall be subjected to the payment of judgments,
the mode of selling or disposing of that property, they are making
regulations which relate purely to the remedy, and are bound only
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by those provisions of the constitution which relate to the remedy
also ; for any abuse of this power amounting to a denial of remedy,
would violate those provisions, and not the one which secures the
inviolability of contracts.
The contract is extinguished by the judgment entered upon it,
and the court entering the judgment decides every question of
law touching its obligation or validity. It then becomes a debt
of record and not by contract. A suit cannot afterwards be maintained on the contract, and in cases where the contract provides
for a rate of interest higher than that provided by law, after judgment it draws interest according to the legal, and not the contract
rate. This could not be the case if the contract was still in force
and under the protection of the provision of the constitution, that
it should not be impaired. Were it otherwise, if contracts continue in force, and the law in force at the time and place of making the contract, regulating the remedy on broken contracts,
constitute the obligation of contracts, every court in entering
judgment on contracts should specify the time and place, when
and where the contract was made, as well as its rate of interest,
and the sheriff or marshal, in executing such judgment, should
be governed as to the property subject to its payment, and the
mode of disposing of or selling the same, not by the law in force
at the time and place of its execution, but by the law in force at
the time and place, when and where the contract was made.
The distinction between contract and remedy is generally, if not
universally, admitted by courts, and the only limitation imposed
upon the power of the legislature to regulate remedies in any case
which I have been able to find, is that it should not be so regulated as to impair the obligation of contracts.
In the ease of Ogden v. Sanders, 11 Wheat. 213, Chief Justice
MARSHALL, after showing that obligation and remedy are distinguishable from each other; that the first is created by the act of
the parties, and the last afforded by the government, says: "If
the law goes further (than to regulate the remedy) and annuls the
obligation without affording the remedy which satisfies it, if its
action on the remedy be such as palpably to impair the obligation
of the contract, the very case arises which we suppose to be within
the constitution. If it leaves the obligation untouched, but withholds the remedy, or affords one which -is merely nominal, it is
like all other cases of misgovernment, and leaves the debtor still
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liable to his creditor, should he be found, or should his property
be found where the law affords a remedy."
In the case of Greenv. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, the court says: "It
is no answer that the acts of 'Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy, and not of a right to the lands. If these acts so
change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially
to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as
much a violation of the compact as if they directly overturned
his rights and interests."
In the case of Bronson v. KYinzie et al., 1 How. 311, the court
adopt and approve this rule, and say "If the law of a state passed
afterwards has done nothing more than change the remedy upon contracts of this description, they would be liable to no constitutional
objection, for, undoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure the
modes of proceeding in its courts, in relation to past contracts as
well as future. It may, for example, shorten the period of time
within which claims shall be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
It may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements
of agriculture, or the tools of a mechanic, or articles of necessity
and household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable
to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have
always been considered, in every civilized community, as properly
belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity. It
must reside in every state to enable it to secure its own citizens
from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those
pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of
every community. And, although a new remedy may be deemed
less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree render
the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely
to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state,
provided the altqration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it
is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself.
In either case it is prohibited by the constitution."
I have found no case laying down a rule more restrictive than
these of the power of the legislature relating to remedies for the
enforcement of contracts. The two last cases illustrate the effect
of this rule. in Green v: Biddle, the acts of the Legislature
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of Kentucky were held to impair the compact between the states
of Virginia and Kentucky. That compact, as construed by the
court, provided that all questions touching lands in Kentucky held
under grants from the state of Virginia should be tried and decided
according to the laws of Virginia then in force. The laws of
Kentucky provided that those rights should be tried and decided
in a different manner, and of course they directly impaired the
compact.
And in Bronson v. Kinzie it will, on examination, be perceived
that the obligation to pay was created by the bond, and if nothing
more had been done, Bronson would have had to take such remedy
as the law afforded him; but he proceeded further and secured to
himself a complete remedy for the enforcement of the obligation
of the bond, and it follows necessarily that any law which changed
to his prejudice the remedy thus secured by his contract would
impair the obligation of that contract.
A law discharging any portion, however small, of the mortgaged
premises from the payment of the debt, or imposing onerous conditions upon the mode of selling the same, would impair the contract, and if the remedy provided by law for the enforcement of
contracts in force at the time the contract is made, is to be regarded
in the same light as a remedy secured by the contract of the parties, then it would follow, as a necessary consequence, that any
law subsequently made exempting any property, however small,
from the payment of the contract, which at the time of the making
of the contract was by law subject to the payment thereof, would
impair the obligation of the contract.
If, then, whenr a contract is made, the law in force subjects all
the property without exception to the payment of the debt created
by the contract, any law passed afterwards, exempting necessary
implements of agriculture, or the tools of a mechanic, or articles
of necessity and household furniture, would impair the obligation
of the contract; it would be no answer to say that regulations of
this description have always been considered, in every civilized
community, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be exercised
or not by every sovereignty according to its own views of policy
and humanity; for whatever may have heretofore been considered,
the states of the Union are expressly prohibited from the exercise
of such power. The question is not whether it is proper and
expedient for a state to exercise such power, but whether the
state has, under the constitution, power to exercise it. The pro.
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hibition is general, and does not depend upon expediency. It follows, then, that the admission that the legislature may, after a contract has been made, exempt from its payment any property, which
at the time it was made was subject to its payment, implies that
the laws in force at the time contracts are made for their enforcement, do not constitute the obligation of the contract, and that all
laws, providing remedies for the enforcement of contracts, are
subject to be changed from time to time by every sovereignty,
according to its own views of policy and humanity. That this
power must reside in every state to secure its citizens from unjust
litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every community.
If these views be correct, the provisions of the constitution
and laws of both the state and territory of Kansas, exempting
homesteads from forced sales, and regulating the manner of selling property under execution, and providing that lands sold
under execution shall be subject to redemption, are valid, as well
in respect to contracts made before, as after their adoption.
It is as much a violation of the Constitution of the United
States, to exempt the necessary implements of agriculture, or the
tools of a mechanic, or articles of necessity and household furniture from sale for the payment of debts due by contract, as it is
to exempt from such sale a farm or a house and lot in a town;
the only difference is in expediency. There is no difference in
principle. And if the power to do so in either case exists, it is
to be exercised or not by the state, according to its own views of
policy and humanity. If the power to do so does not exist, it
cannot be exercised in either case ; if it does exist, it may be
exercised in either or both, at the pleasure of the state.
Having shown that property may be exempted altogether from
sale under execution, it is a familiar principle that the larger
includes the smaller power, and that a state may, instead of
exempting property altogether from sale, prescribe the terms and
conditions upon -hich it shall be sold, such as that it shall not be
sold for less than two-thirds of its value, and shall be subject to
redemption from such sale within two years. If, in the exercise
of this power, the legislature should so clog it with conditions as
to amount to a denial of remedy, they would violate that provision
of the state constitution which provides that " every person, for
an injury done him in his person, reputation, property, or immu
nities, shall have a remedy by due course of law; and right and
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justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely
and without denial, promptly and without delay," and not the provision of the Constitution of the United States, that no state shall
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The two pro.
visions relate to and provide for different and distinct things.
If the law for the enforcement of contracts does constitute their
obligation, then it is the law in force at the time and place where
the contract is made. Then, in order to determine whether the
Constitution and law of Kansas impair the obligation of the con.
tract in question, it is necessary to know at what place the contract is made, and what were the laws then in force at that place
for the enforcement of contracts. This would require that the
sheriff should know at what time and place the contract was made
upon which the. judgment he was to execute was entered, as well
as what laws were in force at that time and place, in order to know
how to execute the same.
I. We publish the foregoing opinion,
though not given in the court of last
resort in the state, for the reason that it
very clearly presents one view of the
much-controvertcd question as to the
true meaning of the provision in the
National Constitution forbidding states
from impairing the obligation of contracts, and for the additional reason,
.which it gives us pleasure to record, that
in probably no state in the Union of
equal population is there to be found
more ability at the bar and on the bench
than in the comparatively new state of
Iansas.
We quite recently had occasion (vide
note to JcCormkdk v. Rusch, 3 Am. Law
fReg. N. S. 93, 105) to observe the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reconciling all of the decisions upon the
subject discussed in the foregoing opinion, and to state that they might, in a genoral way, be divided into three classes.
One class maintains that the obligation
of a contract, legally regarded, consists
in the remedy which the law gives to
enforce it, and, as a consequence, the
efficiency of the remedy cannot be im-

paired without thereby* impairing the
obligation. Another class broadly distinguishes between "obligation" and
"remedy,"
and. maintains that the
remedy may be changed, or even wholly
taken away by the legislature without
contravening the Constitution of the
United States. (See Read v. .Frankford
Bank, 10 Shepl. (Me.) 318 and other
cases cited 3 Am. Law fReg. N. S.
105.) The case under review would
seem to range itself under this class.
But the prevailing view is a middle
one between these extremes, and asserts
the doctrine that the remedy may be
changed in the regular and ordinary
course of legislation, provided it be not
destroyed, or the rights which existed in
favor of the creditor at the -time the contract was made are not substantially
interfered with, seriously embarrassed, or
defeated: Morse v. Gould, 11 N. Y. (I
Hern.) 281, 1854; Bronsonv. Kinzze, 1
Ow. (U. S.) 311, 1843; McCracken-r.
.2aMiward, 2 Id. 608, 1844; Gantley's
Lessee v. Ewing, 3 Id. 311, 1844; Sturges v. Crowningshleld, 4 Wheat. 200,
201 ; Mason v. Haile, 12 'Wheat. 373;
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Chadwick v. Mfoore, 8 Watts & Serg. "if it think proper, direct that tho
49 ; llcCormick v. Rusch, supra; Auld necessary implements of agriculture, or
v. Butcher, 2 Kans. 135, 155, per the tools of a mechanic, or articles of
necessity or household furniture, shall.
Con, C. J.
This view admits that, as to existing like wearing apparel, not be liable to
contracts, the legislature may make execution on judgments."
This dictum of the chief justice was
changes in the statute or law, provided
the obligation be not affected. But what approved and decided to be law by the
changes will be considered as impairing Supreme Court of Michigan, by which
the obligation, is. left uncertain, and it was adjudged that an act exempting
depends upon the opinion which each from execution certain property (e. g.
distinct tribunal may happen to entertain "to each practical farmer, one yoke of
cattle"), though retrospective, did not
or form.
II. How far, if at all, the lcgislature impair the obligation of contracts : Rockmay, as to prior contracts, pass laws well v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 197,
exempting the property of the debtor 1846 ; and see Id. 172, 38).
But the dictum above referred to was
from seizure and sale on execution, is a
question which yet remains to be authori- disapproved and decided not to be law
tatively settled by the Supreme Court of by the Supreme Court of New York in
Quackenbush v. Dunks, 1 Denio 128,
the United States.
The direct decisions on this subject in 132, 1845, in which 'Mr. Justice BRoNthe state courts are comparatively few, so, in the course of his very able opinto some of which we shall presently ion, affirmed that flere was "no wellrefer. Eminent judges have, however, defined middle ground between holding
in several instances expressed opinions that none of a debtor's property can, by
favorable to the validity of reasonable a subsequent law, be withdrawn from
exemption laws even when made to have the reach of the creditor, or else admita retrospective operation. In Bzgelow ting that the whole of his estate may be
v. Pritchard, 21 Pick. 169, 174, A. D. exempted from sale on execution." This
view was affirmed on appeal by the Court
1838, PUTNAM, J., arguendo, skid: "It
would not be contended, as we suppose, of Appeals, the judges being equally
that the legislature may not lawfully divided in opinion (1 Comst. 129). The
exempt a part of the property of a act, the validity of which was drawn
debtor from attachment or levy on exe- in question, exempted only a limited
cution, for example, articles of furni- amount of property, viz., "necessary
tare, beds, bedding, &c., necessary for household furniture and working tools
To that and team owned by a householder or
the debtor and his family.
extent the remedy to enforce payment is head of a family, to the value of not
The constitutionality
diminished rightfully." A similar opin- exceeding $150."
ion was expressed by Mr. Justice WOOD- of this act as to debts contracted before
BURiy, of the Supreme Court of the its passage, was again presented to the
United States, in The Planters'Bank v. Court of Appeals in Mlorse v. Gould, 11
Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 330, A. D. N. Y. (I Kern.) 281, 1854, and, upon
1848, with reference to laws exempting great consideration, the court affirmed
its validity.
tools or household goods.
And the Supreme Court of Iowa has
Bronson
in
TAxEY,
Justice
Chief
So
v. Kinzie, remarks obiter that a state declared (Ffelfenstein v. Cave, 3 Iowa
may as to past as well as future contracts, 287 ; Newell v. Hayden, 8 Iowa 140)
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that laws granting exemptions from
executions affect the 'remedy, and that
the exemption of a homestead, subject
to the qualifications and limitations propounded in B ronson v. Kinzie, MfcCra1 en v. Tayward, is as truly a part of the
remedy, as the exemption of a horse or
other article of property. But in that
state, as in most others, the homestead
is expressly made liable for antecedent
debts : 1 Iowa 442, 1 Am. Law IReg.
(N. S.) 716, note.
The validity of the homestead exemption provided for by the Constitution
of Kansas (Art. 15, sec. 9, supra), as
to prior contracts, came before the Supreme Court of that state in the ease of
Cusie v. Douglass, and was decided in
February of the present year (1865).
The opinion, which was delivered by
CnozsEn, C. J., is yet in MS., and will
be reported in 2d Kansas, now in press.
The court recognise Bronson v. Kinzie,
and their obligation to follow it in the
construction of the clause in the National Constitution. The decision in
Cusie v. Douglass is based upon the
above-quoted dictum of C. J. TAwEY as
to the exemption of agricultural implements, &c. The court remark that "It
is just as essential to the well-being of
a community that the people have houses
to live in as that they have tools and
implements to work with. The principle that authorizes the exemption of
the one must necessarily include the
other." The court admitted that the
state could not make disproportionate
and unreasonable exemptions; but, considering that a general rule had to be
adopted and the new condition of the
country, they could not judicially say
that the exemption was greater than
sound policy dictated.
The prediction of Bnoxsox, J. (1
Hill (N. Y.) 132), that Vif the question turns on what is 'necessary' for the
debtor and his family,, the learned chief
justice (TAxEY) will find it impossible

to stop with the articles he has enumerated," has thus come to pass.
Here the exemption is of 160 acres of
farming land, or of one acre if within
the limits of a city or town, with all
improvements thereon. There is no limitation as to value. It may be worth
thousands of dollars, or it may be worth
only a very few hundreds. But if such
an exemption is valid as to existing
contracts, what or where is the limit ?
In principle it is difficult to distinguish
between a law exempting agricultural
implements, tools, &c., and one exempting a house or workshop; and, it would
seem, we must admit the validity of an
act exempting a homestead, or else fall
back upon what is perhaps the better
and safer doctrine, viz., that, with respect to debts contracted in the state,
"such property as was subject to execution at the time the debt was contracted
must remain subject to execution until
the debt is paid." This gives us a plain,
clear, safe, and just rule. The other
rule is necessarily indefinite, and may be
made the cover of gross frauds upon
creditors. The creditor has no remedy
against his debtor but to sell his property. If all the homesteads in a state
are withdrawn from sale, it is evident
that the rights of creditors are most
materially diminished. On examining
anew the decisions of the U. S. Supreme
Court on the subject of the obligation
of contracts, from the earliest down to
the latest (Hawthornev. Calef,2 Wall.).
we are persuaded that that tribunal will
deny the validity of exemption laws as
to antecedent obligations.
III. Whatever may be thought of the
question on principle, or of the soundness of the views presented in the opin-'
ion of Judge GILCHRIST with respect to
the Appraisement Laws, it is undeniable
that the weight of authority is against
the validity of sfich
laws as to contracts
in existence at the time of their passage.
We do not think the principal case
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can successfully be distinguished from
Bronson v. Kinzie, 31cCracken v. Hayward.
Affirming the unconstitutionality of
such legislation, see, in addition, Gantley's Lessee v. Ewing (declaring Indiana
Appraisement Law void); Pool v. Young,
7 Mon. (Ky.) 587, 1828; Id. 542;
Bailey v. Gentry, 1 Mo. 164, 1822; 4
Id. 58, 1835 ; WIllard v. Longstreet
(holding such laws invalid as to prior
contracts) 2 Doug. (Mich.) 172; see
Id. 38, 197 ; Hunt v. Gregg, 8 Blackf.
105 ; Rosier v. Hale (holding that valuation laws could not apply to prior contracts), 10 Iowa 470, 1860.
A very interesting point under the
Appraisement Law arose in the recent
case of Heferlin v. Sinsinder.Rn, decided
by the Supreme Court of Kansas in February 1864 (2 Kansas ]Rep). The note
upon which the action was brought was
made in the state of Missouri in A. D.
1853, payable one day after date. Suit
was commenced on the note in Kansas
August 1st 1859, which was after the
Appraisement Law took effect, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
December 13th 1859, on whichfi.fa. issued July 31st 1860. The case is silent
as to whether the plaintiff was a resident
of Kansas prior to the taking effect of
the Appraisement Law, or was ever a
citizen or resident of that state. It was
held by the District Court that, inasmuch
as the note upon which judgment was
rendered antedated the passage of the
Appraisement Laws, these laws could not
constitutionally apply to it, and consequently a sale without appraisement was
valid. But the Supreme Court, in the
case last cited, reversed this ruling upon
the ground that the case differed in a
most important particular from Bronson
v. Kinzie and MfcCracken v. Hayward.
The views of the court may be thus
compressed: In those cases the con-

tracts were made in Illinois at a time
when no appraisement was required, and,
upon an attempt to enforce them in that
state, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that to require the property
to bring two-thirds of its appraised value
would operate to impair the obligation
of the contract. This was upon the
theory that the law in force at the date
of the contract was part of it, and could
not be changed to the prejudice of the
- creditor.
But here the contract was not
made in Kansas ; it was made before
Kansas was organized; hence it was not
made with reference to Kansas law, and
there was no Kansas law to become part
of it. The law of Missouri only became
part of it with reference to its construction when sought to be enforced in another state. Each state decides for itself
how far, and in what manner, the property of its citizens may be sold; and
over this subject each state has full power
provided it does not violate the obligation of existing contracts. Changes in
our laws cannot be said to impair the
obligations of contracts made in another
state. Foreign creditors must take our
laws as they find them. Plaintiffs might
have complained of such a change if
made in Missouri, where the contract
was entered into. "But upon going
into another jurisdiction in pursuit of
their remedy, they cannot complain,"
says CRozIR, C. J., "if the law of
the remedy, at that place, is less efficient
than the law of the place where the contract was made."
We do not now recollect that this precise point has before been decided; and,
assuming that the creditor bad. never
resided or been domiciled in Kansas, and
that the note was not made by a resident
of or with reference to the laws of Kansas, we see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion reached.
J. F. D.
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A contract for a certain number of "dollars," though stipulated to be paid in
g Id,is not a contract for gold as bullion or merchandise, but as money, and therefore payable in any lawful money.
The Acts of Congress called the Legal Tender Acts, do not merely confer a
privilege on debtors for their benefit, but are measures of public policy, and the
right under them to pay in any lawful money cannot be waived, even by express
consent.
The measure of damages for non-performance of a contract to pay money, is the
number of legal dollars, without regard to stipulations' as to the kind of money by
which the contract was to be discharged.

THIs wai an action on a note given in 1862, for the sum of
$800, of which $500 was to be paid in gold. The circuit judge
admitted evidence to show that the note was given for money
loaned, $500 of which was in gold, and was agreed to be repaid
in like money. He also allowed the plaintiff to show that at the
time of the trial, gold was worth a premium of fifty per cent. in
treasury legal-tender notes, and rendered judgment against the
defendant computed upon that basis.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-The constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act (so
called) is not disputed by counsel, but itis insisted that gold coin,
though money, is also an article of traffic in which parties may
deal as with other merchandise. And it is also urged that, regarding it as money merely, there is nothing in the law preventing the
borrower from stipulating for its repayment in kind, and that when
he does so he waives, by his contract, the privilege which the
statute allows of payment in a depreciated currency, and becomes
liable to pay such damages as the other party actually sustains.
As to the first point, it is to be observed that the contract before
us is not for the. delivery of gold in bullion, or by the ounce or
other quantity, but for the payment of so many dollars. It is
plain that by it the parties have not undertaken to deal with the
gold as merchandise, but as money. We recognise fully the fact
that gold, as an article of traffic, has its value, regulated by the
supply and demand; and when dealt in as a metal simply, the
laws respecting moneys and legal tenders do not affect the contracts.
It when parties undertake to provide for the payment
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of their debts in money, their contracts are necessarily made sub.
ject to the laws of the country prescribing what is money, and
also what shall be the legal equivalent for the specific payment
which they may have promised. While, therefore, the considerations which have been urged can have no bearing upon this case,
-neither is the conclusion we have arrived at to be regarded as
questioning the validity of such contracts for gold as we have
alluded to.
And it seems to us difficult to press the second point with any
force without at the same time assailing the Legal Tender Act as
unconstitutional. Before the passage of that Act, all contracts
for the payment of dollars generally were payable in gold and
silver, because, by the statutes then in force, coin from those
metals could alone be lawfully tendered in payment; Itnd as parties are supposed to make their contracts in reference to the existing law, all prior contracts were to be construed precisely as if
the words " payable in gold and silver coin" were incorporated
therein. And if all such contracts may now be discharged by
legal-tender notes .to the specified amount, we are unable to see
why a contract, which includes this stipulation in its terms, is not
subject to be discharged in the same way.
The rules which govern this case seem to us few and simple.
If legal-tender laws, were designed chiefly to confer upon debtors
a privilege, there would be force in an argument that the class to
be benefited might waive the privilege by stipulation in their contracts. But these laws are also based in great measure upon
reasons of state policy, which sometimes, to a considerable degree,
override and disregard individual interests. The act in question
was based exclusively upon reasons of a public character, which,
in the opinion of the law-making power, imperatively demanded
that treasury notes should be made equal in legal value to coin;
and parties have no more right to stipulate that their contracts
shall not be governed by it, than those of a particular locality
have to agree ailiong themselves that this or any other law passed
by the competent authority shall not be in force in such locality.
What shall constitute a dollar in money is fixed by national
law, which, as respects this subject, is supreme. The Legal Tender Act not only made treasury notes money, but it made them a
lawful tender for all private as well as most public dues. In doing
so, it made these notes the legal equivalent for gold and silver
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coin to the same nominal amount. It is true that, at the stock
boards, a difference is recognised, and that the holder of the coin
may command a premium for it in notes; but this fact has no
bearing upon the question when presented to the courts, who must
be governed by the law, if it has been enacted by competent
authority. 'Moreover, gold and silver coin are seldom of equal
value at the stock boards; and it is impossible for any law, fixing
a like legal value upon several species of money, to prevent
fluctuations in their relative market values, caused by circumstances which no legislation can control. But these circumstances
do not authorize the courts to recognise a distinction between
gold and silver, or gold and treasury notes, when the paramount
authority has declared their legal value shall be the same.
Assuming now that the stipulation for the payment of $500 of
the $800 in gold is legally binding on the promissor, what is the
measure of damages for a failure to fulfil the promise ? The
courts have no power to render a judgment payable in one
species of money only; and therefore a judgment rendered upon
a note payable in gold, cannot be made payable in gold only, but
must be for the payment of so many dollars, without specifying
the kind. But if it is to be for the payment of dollars generally,
then it can be rendered only for the number of dollars mentioned
in the note, and interest thereon ; since one dollar is legally just
as valuable as any other dollar. The legal damages for a failure
to pay $500 in gold, cannot possibly exceed $500 in any lawful
currency; and when a court renders judgment for any greater
damages upon such a contract, it sets aside and disregards the
Legal Tender Act altogether.
In the case before us, the court has not only adjudged one
dollar to be worth fifty per cent. more than another dollar, but it
has assumed as the basis of its action that its judgment was payable in depreciated currency; whereas it is payable only in lawful money, whatever that may be. It is no more payable in
treasury notes than in gold or silver; and, although it may be
reasonable to expect that the judgment-debtor will pay in that.,
which he can easiest command, there is no law which authorizes a
court to act upon that expectation in rendering its judgments.
And whether the debtor will pay in one or the other will depend
upon the law and the relative value, not when the judgment was
rendered, but when payment is made. Congress may at any time
VOL.
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repeal the Legal Tender Act; and if it had done so the day after
the rendition of this judgment, the defendant would have been
liable to pay it in coin at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents for
each dollar of the coin borrowed, although the judgment was
rendered as if there was a legal and fixed right to pay in notes.
All contracts for the payment of money are subject to such
changes in the laws respecting the currency as may be made from
time to time by the sovereign power, and the hardships which
result are hardships from which the courts have no power to
relieve.
The court below erred in rendering judgment for more than the
$800 and interest. The judgment must be reversed, with costs
and a new trial ordered.
All the judges concurred.

Supreme Court of New York.
WILLIAM PEEL v. THE BOARD OF METROPOLITAN POLICE.
Where a fund is given -toseveral persons with a direction to distribute it among
a number of beneficiaries, the acceptance of the fund constitutes an engagement
to distribute it in accordance with the terms of the gift. This engagement may be
enforced against the fundholders by a proceeding on the part of an individual beneficiary to recover his share.
Though the beneficiaries in this case were policemen, and the Board of Police
held the fund, and though the policemen had no right to receive a present without
the consent of the Board, yet the acceptance of the fund from the donor warranted
the presumption that the Board consented to its payment.

THIS case was made and submitted under the 372d section of
the Code, without action.
The claim was by a policeman against the Board of Police, to
recover from them his share of the moneys presented by the
ambassadors from Japan to the police force of the cities of Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, to be distributed

between them.
The money was sent to Captain Dupont, with a request that
Mr. Belmont should distribute the sum as stated in their letter,
and the wish was expressed "that the same should be applied in
consonance with your usages, in acknowledgment of the efficiency
of those police officers in contributing so much to our comfort."
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The money was divided between the cities above named, and
$13,750 was appropriated to this city. This sum was paid over
to the Board of Police. The Board, instead of distributing the
money among the police force, adopted a resolution that the donation of the Japanese embassy should constitute the Japanese
Merit Fund, to be invested by the Comptrtillers of New York and
Brooklyn and the treasurer of the Board, and that from the income
$650, there should be paid annually $650, to be divided between
the captain, two sergeants, and five patrolmen who, during the
year, have best discharged their duty-8200 to the captain, $125
to each sergeant, and $100 to each policeman. The Comptrollers
declined to accept the duty, and the fund has remained in charge
of the treasurer of the Board. Payments have been made from
time to time, in accordance with the resolution. The moneys now
in the hands of the treasurer amount to $14,665.62. The plaintiff was a member of the police during the time the Japanese
embassy was in this city, but has since resigned his office.
Two questions were submitted to the court by this case:
1st. Whether the Board of Police had any power or authority
to set apart the said moneys and appropriate the same in the manner above stated ?
2d. Whether the plaintiff was and is entitled to the immediate
payment of his share of the said moneys in proportion to the
number of the whole police force ?

wF. C. Traykagen and J. T. Brady,for plaintiff.-I. The donation cannot be said to have assumed the form of a trust. It was
a mere request that Captain Dupont should hand Mr. Belmont a
certain sum of money to distribute in equal proportions amongst
the members of the police force.
It was, therefore a gift directly to the Torce, to be executed
through an agent, just as if Mr. Belmont, having in his hands
funds of the Japanese, should be instructed to give a dollar to
each policeman in New York. Here is no trust in any judicial
sense of the term.
2. But if any trust were created, Mr. Belmont was the trustee,
and the police force were the ceestuis que trust. Mr. Belmont
should have given the money to them.
3. The Board of Police had no right to hold the money, and
create in respect to it a new trust, of which they were to be the
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trustees, with a new set of cestuis que trust, for whom the Japan
ese never intended to provide.
They had no design to reward future merit, but only to pay
for past service.
4. If the Board of Police received the money merely in behalf
of the force, then they were agents of 'Mr. Belmont to make the
distribution, and should have done so at once.
5. The law will not regard any part of this transaction as cre.
ating any legal trust capable of being worked out in equity, but
merely as a case of money had and received for the benefit of a
class, each of whom has a legal right to his share.
A. J. Vanderpoel, for defendants.-1. The plaintiff did not
acquire any interest in the fund. The statute makes the Board
of Police trustee of all rewards or presents.
The 65th section of the act organizing the Metropolitan Police
prohibits any member of the force from receiving any reward or
present.
That section is as follows:SEc. 65.-The Board of Police, for meritorious and extraordinary services
rcndered by any member of the police force, in the due discharge of his duty, may
permit any member of the police force to retain for his owm benefit any reward or
present tendered him therefor; and it shall be cause of removal from the Metropolitan Police force for any member thereof to receive any such reward or present
without notice thereof to the Board of Metropolitan Police. Upon receiving said
notice, the said Board may either order the said member to retain the same, or shall
dispose of it for the benefit of the Police Life Insurance Fund: Laws 1860, ch.
259, p. 456.

The 37th section, of the general rules established under the 27th
section of statute (Laws 1860, p. 443) provides that "no member
of the police force will be allowed to receive any complimentary
subscription or gift, whether tendered by citizens or policemen."
2. The substance of section 65 was introduced in the Police
Act of 1857, as section 24: Laws of 1857, ch. 569, p. 214.
The evident intention of the statute was to break up an evil,
"the enervating system of rewards," which, according to the history of the times, had grown to such an extent that it was difficult
to secure the performance of special services requiring industry
and ability. Pecuniary rewards were sought for rather than promotion.
The resolutions introduced into the statement of facts place
the fund in the hands of the same persons who are trustees
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of the Police Life Insurance Fund: Laws of 1860, ch. 435, see.
66, p. 457.
3. Can it be contended that a different rule is to be applied to
the reward in this case because it is given in bulk to the force,
than if the proportionate part had been given to each member
directly ? Probably a gift in form similar to the one under consideration was not contemplated when the provision referred to
was introduced into the statute ; but the intent and principle upon
which the legislature proceeded are apparent, and applies to the
one as well as the other.
The gift, by the letter of the envoys, was to be applied according to our usages.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
INGRAIIAM, P. J.-There can be little difficulty in deciding the
question whether the Board of Police had a right to dispose of
the fund in the manner directed by their resolutions. The moneys
were given for a particular purpose, not to the Board of Police,
but to Mr. Belmont, to be distributed among the police force.
When the Board of Police agreed to accept the fund from Mr.
Belmont, they did so under the obligations to dispose of it according to the wishes of the donors. They had no authority to divert
it from that purpose and apply it to the formation of a merit fund
for the whole body of the police that might thereafter exist.
The donors annexed two conditions to their gift, viz., to be distributed among the policemen, and to belong to the then members
of the police force.
The Board was under no obligation to receive it, nor to permit
the police force, without their consent, to receive it. But when
they accepted the money, they must be considered as receiving it
for the purpose of carrying out the wishes of the donors, and with
that intent. If any other object is suggested, it would lead to
the supposition that the Board intended to take the money and
apply it to a purpose foreign to the object for which it was given.
It can hardly be imagined for a moment that the money was given
with any intent of having it so applied; on the contrary, the
donors expressed a wish that Mr. Belmont should explain to the
police force, at the time of disbursing it, that it was so given "in
acknowledgment of the efficiency of those police officers in contributing so much to our comfort."
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It is contended that the statute makes the Board of Police trustees of all rewards. I do not so understand it. The 65th section
provides that the Board may permit members to receive rewards,
and makes it a cause of removal for any member to receive any
such reward or present without notice to the Board. Upon receiving such notice, the Board may either permit the member to retain
the reward, or shall dispose of it for the benefit of the Police Life
Insurance Fund.
The Board is not made the trustee, but has the power to transfer a reward to the Police Life Insurance Fund, and not to any
other purpose. But this provision does not apply in this case. It
is only in case where a member has received a reward. He is
bound to give notice to the Board, and, upon receiving the notice,
they may decide as to the disposition of the present. In this case
no such present has been received. The money is in the hands
of a third person, to be applied in a specified way. If the Board
consented to such application, the members of the police could
receive their share of the fund. If they did not, they had no
authority to receive it, much less to apply it to a purpose different
from that stated in the section on which they rely to sustain their
resolution.
I have no doubt that the disposition made by the Board of Police
was a misappropriation of the fund, not intended by the donors,
unauthorized by the terms on which it was offered, and in violation
of the provisions of the 65th section of the act, if that could in
any way be made applicable to it.
As to the question whether the plaintiff has a right to receive
his share of this fund, there is more difficulty. If the acceptance
of the fund by the Board of Police can be considered an assent on
their part to distribute the fund according to the intent of the
donors, then their consent that the men should receive the present
should be presumed.
The 65th section of the act, and the 37th sectiort-of the general
rules, do not in terms apply to this case at all.
The 65th section is confined to a reward given to an individual
member of the police force, and does not apply to a sum of money
presented to the whole force. The reason of the provision is inap.
plicable. It was undoubtedly to take away from the members the
desire for pecuniary reward, as an inducement for a prompt per
formance of duty, that the section was passed. And the 37th rule
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applies only to presents from citizens and policemen. The present gift was within neither of the provisions, and, strictly speaking,
they do not apply to the case; still, I am by no means disposed
to say that the Board had not the power, on the offer of this fund
to the police force, to prohibit them from accepting it, if, in their
judgment, the receipt of it by the members would have operated
injuriously on the whole body. They had a right to establish
general rules, and may have intended the 37th rule to be broad
enough to cover any gift made to them, giving to the term " citizen" a more comprehensive meaning, so as to include all other
persons in contradistinction to the police force. If it has so extensive a meaning, then the rule, in its spirit, would forbid the
reception by any member of a complimentary gift; and we are
not prepared to decide that the plaintiff, without such consent,
while a member of the police force, had a right to receive such
presents. If he had no right while a member, the right does not
accrue by his resignation. But, as before suggested, the act of
the Board of Police in accepting the moneys under the conditions
annexed to the gift, must be presumed as signifying their consent
to dispose of the same in accordance with the wish of the donors.
We cannot suppose that the Board would accept the same, with
the conditions annexed to the gift, with any other intention.
Our conclusions, therefore, are:1st. That the Board of Police had no authority to dispose of the
fund as directed by their resolution of 31st of August 1860.
2d. That the plaintiff, while a member of the police, had no right
to accept the present without the consent of the Board, and that
no such right accrues by his resignation.
3d. That the Board of Police, by accepting the fund, undertook
to dispose of the same, according to the terms of the donors, among
those who composed the police force at that time, and that their
reception of the money warrants the presumption that they consented to such payment.
We are therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment for his distributive share of the fund.
Judgment accordingly.
SUTHERLAND

and

CLERKE, JJ.,

concurred

